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Despite the plentiful debate on the effects of bank competition on SME access to finance and 
growth, only few studies have explored the impacts on SME cost of debt. This study examines 
how bank market power affects the credit costs of SMEs by using unique matched SME-bank data 
from 17 EU countries. We show that bank market power reduces the cost of debt for SMEs. Such 
a favorable effect is stronger for SMEs that are less informationally transparent, and in the 
economies subject to less credit information depth and business extent of disclosure. These 
findings support the Information-based Hypothesis, whereby market power motivates banks to 
invest in soft information acquisition and to build lending relationships to reduce information costs. 
In addition, we show that despite the favorable effects of relationship lending brought by bank 
market power, SME credit conditions worsen in a more concentrated banking market. 
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1: Introduction  
Financing obstacle has been identified as one of the most serious problems for Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the EU countries (Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, 
SAFE). Existing literature has shown ample evidence that financing is a crucial determinant of 
SME survival and growth (e.g. Ayyagari et al., 2011; Campello and Larrain, 2016) and SME sector 
makes a great contribution to a country’s economic stability and employment creation (e.g. 
Duygan-Bump et al., 2015). 
 In the EU countries, because of the limited capability of SMEs accessing other sources of 
finance, bank finance1, as well as trade credit, are still the dominant sources of external financing 
(e.g. Siedschlag et al., 2014; Brown and Lee, 2014, Palacin-Sanchez et al., 2018).  
SMEs are not scaled-downed version of larger enterprise, and compared with the latter, 
SMEs generally have more difficulties in obtaining bank credit, especially cheap credit (Yoshino 
and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2018) because2, first, SMEs are more likely to be informationally opaque 
due to their lack of information infrastructure and credit history. For example, due to SMEs’ lower 
external monitoring and narrow reporting needs (e.g. audited financial statements), they are more 
likely to be lacking of observable signals for credibility, resulting in an asymmetric information 
problem and that banks’ close and continuous observation become costly for borrowers of small 
loans (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2018). Second, unlike large enterprises, SMEs are 
generally less capable of providing sufficient collaterals for coverage of their risk. This becomes 
even more troublesome since the existence of the asymmetric information problem between banks 
and SMEs, and high transaction costs may lead to more collateral requirements for lending to 
SMEs (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2018). Third, the Moral Hazard problem (Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1998) happens when borrowers intentionally exercise deviated effort or take on higher 
business risk after the issuance of a loan. This is because a borrower’s expected return is an 
increasing function against project risk, but a decreasing function for its lenders. This dilemma can 
be alleviated when the borrower’s after-contract activities can be properly monitored by banks at 
a low cost. However, due to the disproportionally higher costs of due diligence and low 
 
1 The EU banking market is larger in size compared with the US. As of 2017, banking assets were equivalent 
to 280% of GDP for the EU, peaked at 340% back in 2012, but only 88% for the US (source: European 
Central Bank). 




transparency of SMEs, such a problem may not be easily managed by banks. For all these reasons, 
bank lending to SMEs is considered to involve higher costs and credit risk, therefore banks are 
generally more reluctant to extend loans to SMEs, making SMEs more likely to face credit 
constraints (e.g. high interest rate) (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2016).  
Due to the great contribution of SME sector to the EU economy3, the importance of bank 
financing in SME growth and the intrinsic financing constraints of SMEs, plenty of studies have 
attempted to investigate how to improve SME credit availability and to tackle their credit 
constraints. The potential impacts of banking sector e.g. market power of banks and the market 
structure of banking industry, on SME finance have attracted considerable attention during the 
past decade, although the empirical findings are mixed. For example, banks with greater market 
power may cut credit supply to SMEs (Love and Peria, 2014; Leon, 2015) but bank competition 
may also reduce SME credit availability (Alvarez and Bertin, 2016; Ratti et al., 2008). 
The theoretical foundations of the contrasting evidence are mostly built on the Market 
Power Hypothesis (MPH) and the Information-based Hypothesis (IBH). The former one (MPH), 
which is derived from the standard industrial organization models, suggests that market power 
enables firms to engage in anti-competitive behavior (e.g. Vatiero, 2010). Under the banking 
context, increased market power could result in restricted loan supply and manipulated lending 
rates, thereby aggravating borrowers’ financing constraints (Ryan et al., 2014). On the other side, 
a decrease in bank’s market power enhances competition and increases the overall efficiency of a 
banking industry, therefore facilitating credit access (Meslier et al., 2020; Love and Peria, 2014), 
and ultimately leading to a stronger economic growth (Caggiano and Calice, 2016). While, the 
latter hypothesis (IBH, Petersen and Rajan, 1995) conjectures that, in the presence of information 
asymmetries and agency costs, fiercer competition may reduce the incentives of, or make it more 
costly for banks to invest in private information acquisition, and reduce the quality of screening 
and monitoring. In contrast, stronger market power enables banks to build lending relationships 
that reduce the information asymmetries and agency costs between banks and borrowers, to 
efficiently allocate resources to more informationally opaque borrowers (e.g. SMEs), and to 
establish a lending relationship for subsequent periods informational rents (Ryan et al., 2014), 
therefore easing credit constraints (Han et al., 2015; Meslier et al., 2020).  
 
3 According to European Commission, there were 23.9 million EU SMEs in 2016, accounted for 99.8% of 
all EU enterprises, provided over 93 million jobs (66.6%) and €4,030 billion (56.8%) of gross value added.  
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Prior literature has focused substantially on the quantity (amount) of finance available to 
SMEs. For example, SME financing constraints are mostly reflected by the lack of access to bank 
finance and low financing quantity fulfilment (e.g. exclusion, loan turndowns, low bank debt 
usage). However, what is under-studied is the bank market power effects on SME cost of credit - 
another major element composing financing obstacles. Price-related obstacles (e.g. high interest 
rate) are not always numerically reflected in SME access to finance measures such as the ones in 
Love and Peria (2014) and Mudd (2013). In this study, instead of focusing on whether an SME 
has applied bank finance, or if it has successfully accessed to finance, our interest is placed on the 
cost of bank debt. For SMEs, although high credit cost may reflect higher risk, it could also be one 
of the hindrances impairing their survival and development, even though they might have obtained 
an adequate amount of finance (Vos et al., 2007). High credit costs may also lead to SMEs being 
able to afford only partial finance, therefore impeding their investment opportunities. In addition, 
the Moral Hazard dilemma (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) suggests that because of the different 
expected return functions between borrowers and creditors, borrowers could be incentivized to 
adventure on upwardly deviating risk-taking level to compensate the high interest cost after the 
issuance of loans, increasing the uncertainty of repayments and therefore damaging the financial 
stability of a banking industry. For all these arguments, a thorough empirical investigation on the 
effects of bank market power would deepen our understanding on the mechanisms of how small 
business loans are priced and how SME credit conditions could be improved. 
Our study, as the first empirical study based on cross-country matched firm-bank 
relationship, examines the disaggregate level (individual bank-year level) market power effects on 
SME cost of debt using data from EU countries. In addition to providing novel evidence to the 
SME financing constraints literature from a perspective of cost of bank debt, we also extend the 
existing literature by the following ways. First, we distinguish the effects of bank market power 
and of bank concentration on SME credit cost by accounting for the fact that bank concentration 
might be an inappropriate measure of competition (e.g. Bolt and Humphrey, 2015). Our unique 
matched bank-firm database also allows us to detect the direct and varied bank market power 
effects on SMEs in a country at a disaggregate level, where the country-level measures are widely 
criticized in the literature (e.g. Ratti et al., 2008; Ergungor, 2004; Alvarez and Bertin, 2016).  
Second, given the advantages of using financial reporting data and the implicit measure of SME 
debt interest rate under the absence of loan-level data, our panel-structured data consists of a richer 
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number of observations than most of the existing papers in relevant to SME financing constraints 
(e.g. Mudd, 2013; Leon, 2015). This large disaggregate-level dataset enhances the external validity 
of the results, allows us to control for intrinsic industry-level financing cost differences and other 
factors affecting SME credit cost (e.g. financing capability, risk), and allows us to assess if 
information and institutional development would moderate the bank market power effects. Third, 
we make distinctions between the different types of SME financing constraints, focus exclusively 
on the cost of bank debt, and deepen the understanding of bank competition effects on SME finance. 
Our empirical evidence is based on objective indicators of SME cost of debt, rather than indirect 
financing constraints proxies such as the use of trade credit (e.g. Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009), 
manager’s self-assessment (e.g. Beck et al. 2004; ), or estimations based on sensitivity analysis 
(e.g. Ryan et al., 2014; Agostino and Trivieri, 2010). Fourth, unlike Giannetti and Ongena (2009) 
and Rice and Strahan (2010) who examined the bank competition effects on SME cost of credit in 
scenarios with exogenous shocks on bank competition (i.e. foreign bank entry, relaxation of 
banking restriction), our cross-country study does not focus on a specific event but on the market 
power of banks in general, enhancing the validity of policy implications 
In examining the bank market power effects on EU SME cost of bank debt, our principal 
findings from a matched bank-firm sample composed of 77,911 SMEs in 17 EU countries are that, 
disaggregate-level bank market power reduces the cost of debt of SMEs and, relives the financing 
constraints of SMEs in the EU. This favorable effect is more pronounced for those SMEs who are 
smaller and more informationally opaque, and in the economies which are subject to higher degree 
of credit information obstacles and less informationally transparent because banks investing in 
relationship-based lending techniques becomes more effective. Our empirical findings do not show 
support to the Market Power Hypothesis but in favor of the Information-based Hypothesis where 
due to the crucial role of information, greater bank competition reduces the market power of banks 
and impedes banks from investing in private (soft) information acquisition or building relationship 
with smaller and less transparent firms. We also find little supporting evidence on the hypotheses 
proposed by Ergungor (2004), Ruckes (2012) and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). In addition, we 
show that SMEs are charged higher costs on debt in a more concentrated banking market despite 
the favorable effects of relationship lending, suggesting that SME credit availability is more 
constrained along with the leading banks expanding their market shares. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant studies and 
theories. Section 3 describes data and methodologies. Section 4 presents the findings and Section 
5 summarizes. 
 
2: Literature Review 
Recent studies examining the factors affecting SME credit costs have largely focused on the firm-
level determinants such as financial reporting quality (Bauwhede et al., 2015), executive gender 
(Mascia and Rossi, 2017), and firm performance (Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2007). Many other 
studies have also focused on the macroeconomic determinants of SME credit costs such as 
economic stress (Ferrando et al., 2017), unemployment rate (Carroll and McCann, 2016) and 
cultural differences (Chui et al, 2012). There are only handful studies examining the banking 
effects on SME credit allocation, such as Hubbard et al. (2002) which focused on bank capital and 
risk, Bremus and Neugebauer (2018) on banking market integration, and Carroll and McCann 
(2016) on bank profitability and cost structure. However, studies examining the bank competition 
effects on SME lending price in particular are rare although many have paid attention to such 
effects on SME access to finance and financing constraints.  
Several theoretical frameworks have offered implications on the relationship between bank 
market power and SME cost of debt. Ruckes (2004) and Demiroglu et al. (2012), for instance, 
have shown that bank’s changes in credit standards over different economic conditions could be 
an intermediary factor, through variations of price competition, explaining the relationship 
between bank market power and SME cost of debt. Borrower’s credit risk declines when economic 
outlook improves and vice versa. When the economy is in recession, pricing competition among 
creditors are less attractive and banks become protective by increasing interest rates charged on 
high-risk borrowers (e.g. SMEs). However, since the screening process of SME lending is costly 
(Ruckes, 2004), under favorable economic conditions, the likelihood of firms’ default rate declines 
and creditor’s screening and monitoring processes are less marginally beneficial, leading to fiercer 
competition on prices. Therefore, economic condition is expected to be negatively related to SME 
cost of credit and the effect of bank market power on SME borrowing cost is diminished under 
sound economic conditions and vice versa. Evidence from Boyd De Nicolo (2005) supports a 
contrasting conjecture that bank market power is a result of bank’s technology advantage on loan 
screening and monitoring and, a bank with such technology advantage has greater discourse power; 
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and therefore the cost efficiency could be shifted to borrowers with higher credibility by reducing 
interest or non-interest costs for long-term prosperity. Hence, such a conjecture implies that bank 
market power would be negatively related to the cost of credit, and such a favorable effect would 
be stronger for creditworthy borrowers such as those with better credit rating scores. 
Furthermore, as introduced in Section 1, two most widely discussed contrasting hypotheses, 
Market Power Hypothesis (MPH) and Information-based Hypothesis (IBH), could potentially 
explain the mechanisms through which bank market power could affect SME finance although 
neither directly emphasizes on the cost of credit. MPH, which is based on the conventional 
industrial organization theory, suggests that market power enables firms to engage in anti-
competitive behavior (e.g. Vatiero, 2010) and, bank market power, for example, could result in 
restricted loan supply and manipulated lending rates, worsening the financing constraints of 
borrowers. Whilst, IBH (Petersen and Rajan, 1995) conjectures that with information asymmetries 
and agency costs, banks with a market power have stronger incentives to invest in private 
information acquisition from borrowers, to build lending relationship to reduce agency costs, to 
efficiently internalize the costs of private information collection, and to extract informational rents 
in subsequent periods with reduced financing obstacles especially for informationally opaque firms 
(Ryan et al., 2014; Han et al., 2015; Meslier et al., 2020). Although IBH does not specify 
particularly on how bank market power could affect SME finance, it is expected that relationship 
lending could alleviate the financing constraints and credit costs of SMEs. Finally, Ergungor (2004) 
states that bank’s lending activities are either transaction-based or relationship-based, and 
competition reduces bank’s profits from both lending techniques but the effect varies between the 
two alternatives. An increase in competition reduces a bank’s profits from transaction lending 
more than its profits from relationship lending. Therefore, competition encourages banks to shift 
from transaction to costly relationship loans. 
Empirical studies examining the above theories on the relationship between bank 
competition and SME finance provide fairly mixed results. Mudd (2013) and Love and Peria (2014) 
have shown that bank competition improves SME’s access to finance but only non-structural bank 
competition measure (e.g. Lerner index) is found to be significant in the latter study. By measuring 
the level of perceived financing obstacle facing SMEs, Beck et al. (2014) show that obtaining 
finance becomes more difficult for SMEs operating in more concentrated banking markets 
although their interpretation on concentration measure is likely to be biased due to the scales of 
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different economies (e.g. Belize vs France). Basing on the concept of discouragement as a type of 
financing obstacles, Leon (2015) documents that SMEs borrowing discouragement reduces in the 
countries where banking markets are more competitive but such a finding is not affected by the 
concentration level of a banking market.  
Besides these cross-country studies, single country studies in China (Chong et al., 2013), 
Italy (Agostino and Trivieri, 2010), Belgium (Degryse and Ongena, 2007) and UK (Degryse et al., 
2015) generally back the argument that bank market power impedes SMEs to obtaining formal 
bank finance. Ryan et al. (2014) use financial reporting data find that the sensitivity of dependence 
of investment on internal fund is more significant in less competitive banking market. The 
improvement of SME credit availability in these studies supporting MPH are defined as better 
access to finance, less application rejections and discouragements, and less dependency on internal 
funds for investment opportunities. 
In sharp contrast, Ratti et al. (2008) indicate that bank market power increases banks’ 
incentive to acquire private information on potential borrowers and hence relaxes SME financing 
constraints although they criticize themselves that country level competition measure could be 
subject to strong bias. Similar supporting evidence on IBH is also available from Latino countries 
(Alvarez and Bertin, 2016), UK (Abunakr and Esposito, 2012) and Philippine (Tacneng, 2014), 
where bank competition does not necessarily improve credit availability to SMEs due to the special 
role of asymmetric information. There are also studies (e.g. Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004; 
Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001) which suggest non-linear relationship between bank market power 
and SME access to finance. Carbo-Velverde et al. (2009) show that bank market power as 
measured by Lerner index is negatively related to SME credit availability but concentration 
measures suggest an opposite result, highlighting the different concepts between bank competition 
and concentration. 
Above studies have investigated the bank competition effects on SME financing constraints 
in terms of credit accessibility but only a few have focused specifically on the cost of debt. Rice 
and Strahan (2010) report that in a large U.S. small business sample, in states with stronger bank 
competition (open to branching), credit supply expands and small firms borrow at a lower price 
but the amount that SMEs borrow does not alter. Interestingly, their competition measure 
(branching restrictiveness) is not associated with the state-level banking concentration, and 
concentration has no impact on SME loan price. Using the same data, Bonini et al. (2016), however, 
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show that relationship lending is not associated with the rent extraction derived from information 
lock-in. In contrast, high banking market concentration appears to be a cause of SME high 
borrowing costs but this unfavorable effect can be fully compensated if the relationship of an SME-
bank pair is long and comprehensive. 
In the European markets, bank competition reduces SME cost of credit if concentration 
measure is assumed to reflect the degree of contestability (Carroll and McCann, 2016). However, 
Mascia and Rossi (2017) conclude, in sharp contrast, that SMEs operating in more concentrated 
banking markets have lower financing costs. They also find that a bank’s lending standards and 
credit risk taking level do not affect SME credit costs. Finally, Giannetti and Ongena (2009) show 
that an increase in bank competition and reduction in market power as a result of foreign bank 
lending in Eastern European countries stimulate firm’s access to finance and reduces borrowing 
costs for large firms (employees>250), but not for small firms.  
Among the literature reviewed, only Giannetti and Ongena (2009) and Rice and Strahan 
(2010) address the competition effects on SME cost of debt although they aim at specific events 
which cause the changes of bank competition (i.e. foreign bank entry, relaxation of banking 
restriction). Other studies only examine the banking market concentration effects and provide 
inconsistent empirical evidence. However, due to the fact that bank concentration may proxy 
market conditions only rather than bank market power (Ergungor, 2004; Stein, 2002), measuring 
bank market power is more challenging according to the concept of market contestability (Bolt 
and Humphrey, 2015). For example, the theoretical foundation of using concentrations as a 
measure of competition (structure-conduct-performance paradigm, SCP) has been rejected by 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Northcott (2004). In addition, Berger (1995) argues that due to 
the high correlation with other factors, the relation between banking market structure and 
monopoly profit could be biased. Lapteacru (2014) has shown that in European market, 
concentration is not an ideal measure of bank market power or banking market competition. 
Existing literature has also shown that concentration measure (e.g. HHI) is not significantly 
correlated with other non-structural measures (e.g. Lerner Index) (Bolt and Humphrey, 2015).  
In this study, we add to the literature related to SME financing constraints by asking for 
the first time, how does bank market power affect the cost of bank debt of SMEs by using unique 




3: Data, Variables, and Model Specification 
3.1 Data source and matching 
SME survey data has the deficiencies such as small sample size (e.g. Small Business Survey) and 
cross-sectional nature (e.g. SAFE), and therefore we obtain firm-level financial reporting data from 
Orbis Amadeus4. According to EU law, small and medium-sized enterprises are made up of firms 
which employ fewer than 250 persons and have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euros5. 
We also exclude sample firms which do not meet the criteria in some particular ways6. Bank-level 
accounting data are collected from Fitch Connect and bank specialization data from Orbis 
BankFocus. Bank-level data can be directly matched with the firm data but generating variable 
such as bank market power (Lerner index) requires full bank data including those banks which are 
not matched with our SME sample7. Macroeconomic and banking market data used for controlling 
economic and time-series heterogeneities are collected from Heritage Foundation, World Bank, 
European Commission (AMECO), European Central Bank (ECB) and Eurostat. Data are matched 
with SMEs through country code and year. 
We follow existing literature (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2019; Marco, 2019; Ongena and 
Sendeniz-Yuncu, 2011; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012; Barbiero et al., 2016) to define an SME-bank 
relationship at disaggregate level. Consistent with above literature, Kompass database provides 
creditor information of European SMEs and the main bank is defined as the bank which is the most 
preferred debt lender which also provides depositing, liquidity management and other services. 
Such a firm-bank relationship is very sticky and bank switching is very rare in the EU countries 
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Ongena and Smith, 2001), particularly as shown from the Amadeus 
database (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012; Marco, 2019 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,2019). In addition, 
in European countries, bank finance is the most important source of SME finance and therefore 
debt financing data of SME samples from Amadeus is a valid reflection of lending from their main 
 
4 99% of the samples in Amadeus are private firms and, we use the sub-subscription of Amadeus because 
the full subscription contains too many micro-firms with low quality data (e.g. non-genuine values, blank 
spaces). 
5 Estimation, which is based on turnovers, total assets, and employees at two-digit NACE1 and UK SIC 07 
industry-level, is used to define the size of a firm when information on the number of employees and/or 
amount of turnover is not available. 
6 We screen the samples on their activity locations (e.g. overseas territories), industries, legal forms, and 
creditor information. Details are available from authors on request. 
7 We add only cooperative banks, savings banks, and commercial banks in both the matched bank-firm 
sample and the bank-only sample. 
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banks (Fungacova et al., 2017). It is possible that SMEs may over-report or hide identity of their 
main banks for strategic reasons (Yosha, 1995; Diamond, 1991). However, this is not a concern in 
our sample because the Kompass database has access to credit registry information (Brown, 2009; 
Ongena and Sendeniz-Yuncu, 2011; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012). Another concern is the multiple 
banking relationships reported by SMEs in several countries8. We match the first bank listed by 
firms because as instructed by Kompass, bank ranking follows the order of importance as an 
external financier and financial services provider but not alphabetically or by preference (Giannetti 
and Ongena, 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2019).  
Our final sample consists of 3,319 banks in the bank-only database where 528 banks are 
directly matched9 with 77,911 SMEs in 17 EU countries10  over the period of 2007 to 2015. 
Barclays plc serves the greatest number of SMEs in our sample and a typical bank works as the 
primary creditor for 143 firms and the median number is 25. Around 79% of the SMEs are from 
big four countries, i.e. UK, France, Spain, and Germany, and 24% of them operate in 
manufacturing industry and 32% in wholesale and retail industry. 
 
3.2 Variables   
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Banking finance is a dominant source of SME finance in the European countries, but measuring 
borrowing cost at firm-level is challenging without loan level data. Given the fact of SMEs’ limited 
accessibility to other sources of finance and the potential role of banks’ incentives of assimilating 
soft information, and in the absence of loan-level data, we follow recent studies, such as Giannetti 
and Ongena (2009), Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano (2010), Bauwhede et al. (2015) and 
Chui et al. (2016), to measure the cost of debt using the ratio of financial expense to average short-
 
8 The number of relationship banks reported by firms in Kompass varies across countries. The whole sample 
has the median number of bank relationships of 1 and mean value 1.17. Full breakdown of the multiple-
bank reporting across countries is available on request from the authors. 
9 We manually match Fitch Connect and Amadeus databases instead of using text-processing application 
such as OpenRefine. Manual matching process takes account of reporting formats inconsistency caused by 
usage of abbreviation and different Unicode, as well as the actual lending business of banks and potential 
uncertainty. 
10 Banking concentration data obtained from the Global Financial Development is not available for Estonia 
and Iceland, Amadeus does not have debt information for Danish SMEs and Kompass does not have bank-
firm relationship information for the remaining 11 EEA countries. 
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term and long-term debt11 (%). Financial expenses (or interest payment) reported by SMEs are 
mostly loan expenses because they lack access to non-bank funding sources. This ratio is an 
implicit interest rate measure and thus cannot be viewed as the actual interest rate charged on loans. 
It is an index reflecting the level of borrowing costs across SMEs and lower values indicate lower 
cost of debt and vice versa. An advantage of using this implicit measure is that it enables us to 
conduct a large sample study to enhance the external validity of the results. However, the measure 
is prone to outliers coming from errors due to loan repayment, received interest incomes or other 
costs unrelated to borrowing. Therefore, the computed ratio as an index is likely to be higher than 
real cost of debt. We follow aforementioned papers and exclude samples with cost of debt variable 
higher than a value of 0.5 or lower than the left 1st percentile of all observations. Statistics for the 
main variables at country level are reported in Table 1. 
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3.2.2 Bank market power and concentration 
Bank competition (or market power) measured at country-level is empirically unable to capture 
the direct and distinct effects of banks with different levels of market power on firms in a country. 
For examples, there could be banks with significant market power in a banking market that is 
deemed as competitive, and if two banking markets have a similar level of competitiveness, 
regression analysis could not detect the level of disparity within a country. Moreover, country-
level measure matched with firm-level data could overstate the significance of coefficients as the 
degree of freedom is miscalculated (Ergungor, 2004). Hence, examining the impacts of bank 
market power on SME cost of credit requires a measure at the disaggregate level.  
Empirically, there are three indicators that can be used to measure market power at bank-
level, Panzar-Rosse H-statistics (Ranzar and Rosse, 1987), Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) and 
Lerner index (Lerner, 1934). The validity of the H-statistics is conditional on the prerequisite that 
the tested sector must be in a long-run equilibrium (Bikker et al., 2012). We test this in our sample 
countries by using bank profitability models proposed by Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Tabak et 
 
11 Follow Fungacova et al. (2017), bank debt in the Amadeus is decomposed between short-term loans and 
long-term debt and bank debt is the sum of these two components. 
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al. (2015). Similar to Lepetit et al. (2018), our results indicate that the condition is not met12. The 
Boone indicator measured at bank level lacks of literature support and its theoretical foundation 
has been challenged by the assumption of the causality between bank efficiency and market power 
(Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012 and Phan et al., 2016). We therefore adopt the most widely-used 
bank-level market power measure Lerner index13 (Appendix A). The Lerner index measures a 
bank’s level of market power by relating price to marginal cost. A higher value approaching one 
indicates a greater market power. The use of Lerner index as a proxy for bank market power for 
the investigation of SME cost of debt is challenged by the nature that the variable itself is pricing 
power related. However, as reasoned by Fungacova et al. (2017), this is not a concern because the 
variable reflects the market power of an individual at bank-level, which is not specifically refined 
at SME lending market, and we also control for the price-related variables at both macroeconomic 
and banking levels, and address the endogeneity concerns later in Section 3.3. 
Maudos and Guevara (2007) have criticized the derivation of Lerner index as described in 
Appendix A that banks’ market power on lending market could be overestimated because banks’ 
deposit market pricing power is transferrable to the lending market, and this bias could be enlarged 
if a bank’s lending price is sensitive to its marginal cost. Turk-Ariss (2010) proposes a simple 
solution to drop the cost of fund from the trans-log cost function14. However, Forssbeck and 
Shehzad (2015) state that the solution is subject to two inadequacies. First, the Turk-Ariss Lerner 
index could be upwardly biased and the cost to output ratio could be underestimated because the 
trans-log cost function is estimated with only one input price since the function has to hold 
assumption of homogeneity in input prices. Second, dropping price of fund is only applicable when 
the assumption that marginal cost is irrelevant to the cost of fund and deposit rate holds. 
Empirically, both Adams et al. (2002) and Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015) have shown that bank 
market power of deposit market is not associated with the market power in lending market. For all 
 
12 The assumption of the test is that bank profitability should not be statistically correlated with input prices 
under long-term equilibrium. Full testing approaches and results are available on request from the authors. 
13  Practical limitations of Lerner index are that, first, Lerner index could be overstated because risk 
preferences of banks on taking disparate projects are likely to be related to pricing decisions. Second, Bulow 
and Klemperer (2002) find that competitive banking markets do not necessarily prevent banks from 
obtaining market power. 




these reasons, we measure the market power of a bank specifically at the lending market by 
following Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015, Appendix A). 
Section 2 has discussed the difference between the concepts of bank competition and 
concentration, two banking characteristics that are not substitutable. For example, leading banks 
in a concentrated banking market are not guaranteed to have higher market power. However, 
banking market concentration could affect the amount of SME credit supply and the effectiveness 
of relationship lending (e.g. Beck et al., 2004, Ratti et al., 2008). We therefore use macro-level 
variable Herfindal-Hirschman index (HHI) to examine the banking market concentration effects 
on SME cost of debt15.  HHI is the sum of the squared values of each bank’s market share (total 
assets) in a banking market with a value ranging from zero to one indicating a banking market 
from least to most concentrated. We also apply widely used concentration-n (3 or 5) ratios for 
robustness check which are defined as the sum of total assets of three or five largest banks in a 
banking market as a share of total banking industry assets. However, HHI is a superior proxy to 
concentration-n ratios because HHI takes account not only the leading banks but also the remaining 
market participants where concentration-n ratios partially ignore the market share of smaller 
participants in a particular market. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
To account for sample heterogeneity and to address the concern of omitted variable endogeneity, 
we control other factors that affect the cost of bank debt, in addition to our main interested variables. 
The selection of controlling factors is established on the principle that borrowers’ interest rates 
reflect a bank’s perceived (credit) risk level, and the demand and supply in the lending market. 
Hence, we select control variables based on the theoretical foundation of the factors affecting SME 
credit risk (financing capability), credit demand, and credit supply by following existing empirical 
work in relevance to the studies of SME cost of debt (e.g. Bonini et al., 2016; Bauwhede et al., 
2015; Chui et al., 2016; Mascia and Rossi, 2017; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Rostamkalaei and Freel, 
2016). However, control variables are added subject to the following limits and considerations. 
First, data availability. We acknowledge that some factors, e.g. entrepreneur’s characteristics, have 
been documented to be crucial determinants of SME borrowing cost (e.g. Mascia and Rossi, 2017; 
 
15 Ideally, concentration should be measured at regional-level since not all banks are operating at country 
level, but such data are not consistently available across our sample countries. 
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Rostamkalaei and Freel, 2016, 2017), but we do not have these data available. Second, the 
considerations of multicollinearity and firm-level variables’ inner relatedness. Last but not least, 
the trade-off between the number of control variables and the number of observations that can be 
taken into regression analysis, as small and micro businesses in our sample have plenty of missing 
accounting values. 
We include ten firm- and industry-level control, explained as follows. Firm’s size and age 
are expected to be negatively related to cost of debt, as size and age are an inverse proxy of 
bankruptcy cost (Berger and Udell, 1995), and a proxy of borrower bargaining power (Howorth 
and Moro, 2012). Larger, or more mature firms are also less opaque with more public information 
available for credit risk assessment (Bonini et al., 2016). Moreover, consistent with relationship 
theory, more mature firms may have longer-standing relationships with their banks so that private 
(soft) information may be more readily available (Bauwhede et al. 2015). Next, we include a 
dummy variable to capture whether an SME is innovative or not16. A positive sign is expected as 
innovative firms are more likely to be informationally opaque and high in business success 
uncertainty, therefore less attractive to banks due to higher and more professional skill-based 
screening and monitoring costs involved in credit assessment. Cash-richness (cash/total assets net 
cash) and short-term liquidity position (current assets net stock/current liabilities) are expected to 
be negatively related to cost of debt because these two can be an indicator of lower repayment risk. 
In addition, according to pecking order theory, cash-rich and liquid firms prefer to generate funds 
internally (Meuleman and Maeseneire, 2012), resulting in a lower demand on bank credit and 
therefore, higher bargaining power when bank credit is needed. We also control for asset structure 
(tangible assets/total assets) because firms with higher tangibility are more capable of providing 
collaterals that would reduce the risk and control moral hazard (Howorth and Moro, 2012). 
Collateral also acts as a signaling device of the default risk of loan applications, as the level of 
collateralization is negatively related to the riskiness of the borrower’s investment project (Bester, 
1985). The usage of trade credit (net trade credit scaled by total assets) is also controlled for by 
following Casey (2014) and McGuinness et al. (2018). Under the substitution hypothesis (Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2016), which is empirically tested in the EU SME sector by Palacin-Sanchez et al. 
 
16 The dummy variable is coded as 1 if an SME has ever had a patent or a trademark; 0 otherwise. We 
acknowledge that R&D expenses could be a better indicator but only 8% of our sample report such data. 
One limitation of our binary measure is that the data is time-invariant. 
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2018, trade credit is a substitute for bank credit especially when a firm has less capability in 
accessing bank credit, or when the bank lending is tightened or costly. In addition, Carbo-Valverde 
et al. (2009) believe that under normal market condition, the usage of trade credit is an indicator 
for firm credit constraints (e.g. high credit cost) because the implicit assumption is that trade credit 
is an expensive form of short-term external finance alternatives. Hence, a positive association 
between trade credit usage and cost of debt is expected but the relation could be bilateral. Moreover, 
we control for depreciation rate and working capital (both scaled by total assets) into regressions 
by following Chui et al. (2016) and Peel (2019). Depreciation rate is expected to be positively 
associated with credit cost and negatively for the working capital, because SMEs with higher 
depreciation cost and lower amount of working capital are higher in repayment risk to the banks. 
Last, we control for the growth opportunity at industry-level. We follow Behr et al. (2013) and 
Degryse et al. (2012) and measure the growth opportunity of an industry by the weighted averaged 
sales growth rate in the main tests, and by intangibility ratio at industry-level (Di Patti and Dell’ 
Ariccia, 2004) in the robustness tests. From the view of credit demand, Michaelas et al. (1999) 
show that firms with growth opportunities are more likely to exhaust internal funds and access to 
external financing. On credit supply side, since the expected return functions differ between 
borrowers and lenders, the agency theory suggests that small firms are likely to increase their risk-
taking level due to the intensifying incentive of growth, and thus banks react by increasing credit 
price. However, Fungacova et al. (2015) argue that firms with better growth opportunities aim to 
minimize agency conflicts and thus they rely less on bank debt and are less sensitive to bank credit 
supply. All other time-invariant characteristics of individual SME that are not picked up by 
explanatory variables are assumed to be absorbed by individual fixed-effects, otherwise as 
remainder disturbances in the error term. 
 At macroeconomic level, we include real GDP growth rate to capture general economic 
condition (Mudd, 2013) and the ratio of domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) for 
the degree of banking development and bank credit supply (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). A negative 
sign is expected for these two variables. On the credit supply side, the general default risk of SME 
borrowers decreases in time of economic boom, so that banks may increase their credit supply for 
SMEs by reducing lending standards (e.g. cheaper credit). The latter variable is a direct indicator 
of an economy’s amount of bank credit supply. Following Mascia et al. (2017), we include two 
price related variables, inflation rate (GDP deflator) and bank’s net interest margin to control for 
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lending price variation since the cost of debt dependent variables are implicit measures which are 
not directly observed (e.g. loan level data). These price measures must be strongly positive and 
both statistically and economically significant otherwise the dependent variable is not properly 
generated. Last, bank size is measured by logarithm of total assets in thousands of dollars to control 
for bank size effect. Definitions and sources of variables are reported in Appendix B and their 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
(Please insert Table 2 about here) 
 
3.3 Baseline models, specifications, and validity 
We employ the following baseline model (Eq. 1) to investigate the effects of bank-level market 
power and banking market concentration on SME cost of debt. In the equation, Yijcts are cost of 
debt measures for firm i in industry j country c and at time t, and the subscribe b denotes the bank 
which is matched with firm i. θijcs are potential firm fixed effects, or industry-level and country-
level dummies in random-effect models. τt is the potential time fixed-effect. Matrix BMP and BMC 
are bank market power and banking market concentration variables. F, M and B’ are sets of firm 
and industry specific, country-level and remaining bank-level determinants17. εijct is a disturbance 






) = α + β1BMPbt + β2BMCct + C1Fijct + C2Mct + C3B’bt + (θijc) + (τt) + εijct      (1)                              
 
The baseline equation (cost of debt models) is estimated using fixed-effect estimator as 
Hausman test suggests that within-groups estimator is more consistent. We also estimate the 
equation by random-effect maximum likelihood estimator to allow adding time-invariant binary 
independent variable (e.g. innovation) and controlling dummies18. 
 
17 Our correlation matrix, available from authors on request, does not indicate concerns of multicollinearity 
and all variables are correlated with coefficients under 0.5. We manually manage outliers from both firm 
and bank databases instead of using winsorization or extremity truncation. Our approach ensures the data 
quality without sacrificing too many observations or altering original data. Less than 0.3% of our initially 
obtained data are dropped. 
18 Results do not vary if using basic generalized method of moments random-effect estimator or Swamy-
Arora random-effect estimator. 
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We examine the validity of our data and model specification before moving onto empirical 
analysis. Reverse causality and variable omission are two causes of endogeneity. Our empirical 
models are not subject to reverse causality issue because, first, our market power measure is 
calculated at bank-level from Fitch Connect database; while cost of debt is an estimated firm-level 
characteristic generated from the Amadeus database. It is therefore unlikely that cost of debt 
measure can reversely affect bank market power measures (Mudd, 2013; Leon, 2015; Fungacova 
et al., 2017; Love and Peria, 2014). Second, the amount of SME lending accounts for only a small 
fraction of banking business and thus bank characteristics such as market power can hardly be 
affected by SME lending, especially when our analysis adopts a representative sample instead of 
all the firms in the economy. Third, there is no evidence suggesting that SME cost of debt measures 
would directly influence the variables used to derive our market power indicators (e.g. Lerner 
index, Appendix A). The endogeneity concern of omission variable is also of little concern because, 
first, control variables are comprehensively entered our regression analysis according to relevant 
theories and extant literature to capture different aspects of cost of debt heterogeneities. Second, 
the panel structure of our data allows firm-level fixed-effects to remove all time-invariant 
unobservable effects that could be possibly related to variables on both sides. In addition, we 
instrument the market power variables and carry out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the result 
does not suggest the existence of endogeneity. Nevertheless, the endogeneity concern is 
empirically addressed in our robustness test section and we treat banking concentration as an 
exogenous variable as it is measured at country-level. 
Although our models are not subject to reverse causality issue, another econometrical 
concern could arise on the basis of selection bias where the findings between bank and firm 
variables in our regressions may reflect pre-existing bank-firm relationship so that certain types of 
firms tend to cooperate with banks with certain characteristics. This selection bias concern matters 
only at cross-sectional dimension because the panel setting of our data controls for the time-series 
variations. To address this problem, we carry out the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient test (ICC) 
to examine how strongly units (SMEs) with a fixed degree of relatedness (e.g. firm size, age) in a 
same group (a bank) resemble each other. Test results19 indicate that our sample does not suffer 
from selection bias. 
 
19 ICC response groups are classified into three. They are SME attributes that are not able to be influenced 




4: Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
We present our baseline results in Table 3. From left to right, all models include inflation variable 
as it is a basic control for our implicit cost of debt measure20. Model 1 only includes bank market 
power measure and basic firm-level controls (size and age), Model 2 include full firm-level 
controls, and the following two models respectively take in macroeconomic (including HHI index) 
and bank controls. Model 5 comes with a full variable set. The reason for gradually adding controls 
into the models is to examine the stability of our main interested parameters to be estimated. Model 
6 is the simplified version where three variables that could potentially induce econometrical 
problems are removed21. Model 7 is estimated using random-effect maximum-likelihood estimator 
for comparison and allows for the existence of time-invariant variable Innovation. Any model with 
a prime sign (’) is the same as a specific model except for the Lerner index being substituted by 
lending market Lerner index (see Appendix A).  
   The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of disaggregate level bank 
market power and country level banking market concentration on SME cost of debt. Starting with 
bank market power, Lerner index and that for lending market have significantly negative 
coefficients with similar magnitudes across all models. Our Lerner index variable has a mean value 
of 0.23, median 0.24 and standard deviation 0.12, which are similar to those of the sample adopted 
in Love and Peria (2014). As previously explained, the dependent variable, cost of debt is an index-
 
(e.g. leverage, solvency ratio). All these attributes are directly accessible from their financial reports. Bank 
characteristics are not categorized because a bank by its identity has already defined a group of banking 
characteristics that are tested with response groups. Test results indicate that apart from a small group of 
similar sized SMEs tend to work with certain banks in Cyprus and Latvia, there is little evidence that other 
SMEs with similar characteristics are intraclass-correlated to any individual bank. More details on ICC are 
available from Marchenko (2006) and our full test results are available from authors on request. 
20 Results do not change if we use different interest rate variables instead of inflation. In fact, the inflation 
and interest rate variables in our sample are highly correlated. We also exclude time fixed-effects in Models 
1 - 6 by following Baum (2006) which suggests that time fixed-effects must be removed if macroeconomic 
factors are controlled for because those factors do not vary across firms. Results do not significantly vary 
if time fixed-effects are added. 
21 In the simplified model, firm age, trade credit usage and country-level bank development variables are 
dropped because of the following reasons. Age variable is not an ideal control in panel data setting as it 
rises with the same increment along with time moving forward across all the cross-sections. Trade credit 
usage could bring reverse causality issue as discussed in Section 3.2.3. Last, the calculation of bank 
development variable captures both financial market development and the importance of banking industry 
(Delis and Kouretas, 2011) and, these two may have offsetting effects on our dependent variable. 
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based implicit measure reflecting the level of cost rather than an actual observation on lending 
price; therefore results cannot be directly interpreted as the actual changes in interest rate. Hence, 
using the simplified Model (6) as an example, the coefficients of Lerner index and lending market 
Lerner index are respectively -2.88 and -3.65, suggesting that a one-standard-deviation rise in the 
Lerner index (Lending market Lerner) leads to an approximately -4.2% (-5.3%) deviation from the 
mean value of cost of debt measure, and -6.2% (-7.8%) from its median value. Alternatively, 
considering a case in which Lerner index increases from sample’s 25th percentile (less market 
power) to 75th percentile position (greater market power), cost of debt index decreases by 10.7% 
if the base is also chosen at 25th percentile (3.33) or 4.0% for the base at 75th percentile (8.93). 
Given the fact that the changes of credit costs should be mainly determined by macroeconomic 
conditions (e.g. monetary policy) and firm-level attributes (e.g. size, tangibility, credit history), the 
effects of market power on SME cost of debt are therefore economically meaningful. 
Our baseline results have shown that bank market power at disaggregate level reduces the 
cost of debt of SMEs, supporting the Information-based Hypothesis (IBH) whereby competition 
increases the SME credit cost and financing constraint because in the presence of information 
asymmetries and agency costs, market power incentivizes banks to build lending relationship and 
to invest in private information acquisition, reducing lending barriers between lenders and 
borrowers especially to informationally opaque firms, e.g. SMEs. Our baseline results show little 
evidence supporting the Market Power Hypothesis (MPH) and the argument by Ergungor (2004). 
Finally, this study examines the banking market concentration effects on SME cost of debt. In 
Table 3, all the coefficients of HHI are of similar magnitude and statistically significant at 1% 
level. Using Model 6 as an example, ceteris paribus, SMEs operating in a less concentrated banking 
market (25th percentile of HHI, 4.97) have lower cost of debt by -8.4% (-12.3%) deviation of the 
mean (median) value of the cost of debt (COD) compared to those in a more concentrated banking 
market (75th percentile of HHI, 6.79). Numerical results conclude that SME cost of debt is higher 
in a more concentrated banking market. 
In terms of other explanatory variables, at firm-level, an SME is credited cheaper along 
with aging and / or growing in total assets as expected. Model 7 shows that cost of debt is higher 
for innovative firms22 and this is because innovation activities are less transparent and have higher 
 
22 This variable (innovation) is only examined in Model 7 because time-invariant dummy variable is not 
allowed in fixed-effect models. 
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uncertainty. Cash-richness variable as a proxy of credit demand and business risk is not significant 
across all models, but liquidity ratio is negatively associated with cost of debt. SMEs with higher 
tangibility are likely to have lower interest costs because tangibility proxies a firm’s capability of 
providing collateral and the collateralization level can be a signal of the riskiness of the borrower’s 
investment project. Models 2-5 show that trade credit usage is positively related to the cost of debt 
as expected. In addition, in most models, deprecation rate and working capital as (inverse) 
measures of firm risk are positively (negatively) associated with SME cost of debt as expected. 
Finally, SMEs operating in industries at the time of higher growth opportunity are likely to be 
charged at higher interest premium. The possible reasons are that small firms tend to exhaust 
internal funds and depend more heavily on external finance when facing a growth opportunity. In 
addition, due to the different expected return functions between SME borrowers and their lenders, 
banks may have to react by increasing credit risk premium to compensate the extra risk exposed. 
 For bank and country variables, two lending price related controls are indeed strongly and 
significantly linked to the cost of debt measure, as they are pure controls for SME funding price at 
macroeconomic and bank level. They are more appropriate to be entered in estimations as control 
variables rather than to be price-adjustment factors because the dependent variable is index-based 
but not an actual observation (Hail and Leuz, 2006). An interesting finding is that larger banks are 
more likely to charge higher interests. This result eliminates the concern that the negative bank 
market power effect could be a reflection of bank size effect23. Finally, as expected, GDP growth 
rate and a proxy for bank credit supply, are both found to have a favorable impact on reducing 
SME cost of debt. 
(Please insert Table 3 about here) 
  
4.2 Robustness tests 
By following our baseline Model 6 (Table 3), we employ different approaches to test the robustness 
of our baseline results. 
First, we test if the baseline findings are driven by a specific group of firms (Table 4). Our 
SME samples are regrouped by country, year, industry, and total debt ratio factors. Specifically, 
 
23 We also checked our bank-only dataset that the bank market power and bank size variables used in our 
study are not statistically associated, confirming the independence of the interpretations made on these two 
sets of bank-level variables. 
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the sample is grouped into big-4 countries and others24 (Model 1), financial crisis period (2007-
09) and post-financial crisis period (2010-15) 25  (Model 2), operating in the industries of 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and others (Model 3) and lower and higher level of total 
debt ratio26  (Model 4). Table 4 shows that the coefficients of Lerner index and HHI are all 
consistent with those of baseline models and they are all statistically significant at 1% level. 
Results do not change if we replace Lerner index by that of lending market and replace HHI by 
concentration-3 ratio, confirming that our findings from baseline models are not driven by a 
specific group of firms. We also group our sample by bank specializations (commercial bank vs. 
cooperative bank vs. savings bank) and complete the regressions by using a Lerner index 
(Appendix A) that is adjusted for the inclusion of bank specialization dummies. Our baseline 
findings (not reported) do not alter. 
(Please insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Second, we test the robustness of our baseline models by using alternative cost of debt 
(COD) variables. In Table 5, we adopt four measures that are slightly different from the COD used 
in baseline models. All in percentages, COD1P is redefined as the total interest payment divided 
by average total bank debt (Model 5). COD2 (Model 6) is the same as COD but instead of scaling 
the financial expenses to average debt, it uses average liabilities. COD1NA (Model 7) and 
COD1NAL (Model 8) are defined respectively by dividing financial expenses to current and 
lagged total bank debt where the baseline model (COD) uses average total bank debt. The 
coefficients of Lerner index and HHI provide same conclusion as the baseline models. 
Models 9 and 10 adopt two cost of debt dependent variables that are adjusted respectively 
by interest rate and inflation rate. Following Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009), we define the interest 
rate adjusted cost of debt ratio COD.CV as the difference between the ratio of financial expenses 
to average bank debt and country-year level mean value of nominal long-term and short-term 
interest rates (Source: AMECO database by European Commission). Following Chui et al. (2016), 
 
24  Big four countries in this sample are France, Germany, UK, and Spain according to their size of 
economies and contribution rates of the number of SMEs in the full sample. 
25 Results do not vary if the sample is regrouped into two equal halves (2007-11 vs. 2011-15) along the 
time. 
26 Total debt ratio is measured as the sum of short-term loans plus long-term loans divided by total assets. 
The threshold (less vs. more) for our sample is 21.7% as it equally divides our SME sample into two. 
Results still hold if the threshold is amended to 15% or 25%. 
22 
 
we measure the real cost of debt (inflation adjusted cost of debt, RCOD) as [(1+COD)/ 
(1+0.5*πt+0.5*πt-1)]-1, where COD is the average cost of debt explained previously and π is 
inflation rate. Bank net interest margin and inflation rate variables are dropped since these price 
related variables are adjusted in dependent variables. The estimated coefficients are negative and 
significant for Lerner index and positive and significant for the HHI, confirming that bank market 
power relieves SME financing constraint in terms of cost of debt and SMEs are charged at a higher 
interest rate in a more concentrated banking market27.  
We next translate the cost of debt index into growth. The dependent variable in Model 11 
is a binary variable (COD.LDVM) which is coded as one if an SME experiences increased rate of 
implicit cost of debt measure (COD); 0 otherwise. Around 46% of observations show increasing 
financing cost in our sample. A limited dependent variable model (LDVM) is estimated using 
random-effect panel Probit estimator28. Estimation output shows that the probability of a rise in 
financing cost of an SME decreases by approximately 4.3% if the Lerner index increases by one-
standard-deviation. In Model 12, dependent variable (COD.GR) is a two-year moving average 
growth rate of the ratio of financial expenses to total assets. We use two-year moving average 
instead of arithmetic average because it reduces the skewness by big jumps in the regression 
analysis. Estimation output shows that bank market power reduces the growth rate of SME credit 
cost. Although these two interpretations are made on growth rate, they are translated aligning with 
our main findings, according with the Information-based Hypothesis. 
The statistics (not reported) show that SME credit costs vary significantly across industries 
and we address the concern of industry-level natural difference in cost of debt by introducing 
another dependent variable COD.delta, which is calculated as the difference of the COD from 
industry weighted averaged value across years (Model 13). This variable eliminates the natural 
heterogeneities of financing costs across different industries and a positive value implies that an 
SME at a time is financed with higher price than the industry ‘standard’ and vice versa for negative 
value. Estimation results align with our baseline findings. 
 
27 Using price adjusted measure is exposed to one major concern that, in the absence of direct loan level 
data, the cost of debt values are implicit estimations reversely calculated from financial reporting data. 
However, interest rate and inflation rate data are actual values. Subtracting actual price-related 
macroeconomic observations from estimated values would generate biased results since two values are not 
at the same level of scope. The bias is predicted to be that adjustments are less effective because of the 
disproportionately higher value ranges of reversely estimated cost of debt ratios (Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
28 Results do not vary if using fixed-effect panel logit estimator. 
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The last model in Table 5 (Model 14) uses a dependent variable named COD.CV.adj, which 
is based on COD.CV. It considers the debt maturity and the interest rate adjustment factor is 
weighted by short-term debt ratio to short-term interest rate and long-term debt ratio to long-term 
interest rate. Same as above, price related controls are dropped and Lerner index is still 
significantly negative but not for HHI. 
Moreover, we substitute all the Lerner index in Model 5 to 14 by lending market Lerner 
index and our earlier results hold (not reported). In addition to substituting dependent variable, 
recall that we adopt different methods when estimating the Lerner index (see Appendix A), we 
substitute alternative Lerner indices into the baseline Model 6 (Table 3), and all of them entered 
negatively and significantly. Also, in baseline Model 6, results do not change if we replace HHI 
by concentration-3 ratio (0.021***) or concentration-5 ratio (0.011***). Additionally, we substitute 
each of our control variables by their alternative measures29and our baseline findings still hold. 
(Please insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Third, although the coefficients of correlation between two market power variables and 
HHI are both less than 0.03, and literature as discussed in Section 2 has shown that bank 
concentration is not statistically correlated with non-structural measures (e.g. Lerner index) and 
the SCP paradigm is rejected, we still address the potential causality concern when both being 
added into the regression. In Table 6, Models 15, 16 and 17 considers HHI, Lerner index and 
lending market Lerner index, respectively. Results show that all coefficients of such measures are 
close to those in baseline Model 6 (Table 3), providing additional supporting evidence that bank 
market power and concentration are not conflictual when both being added to the estimations. 
Fourth, we examine if cost of debt is determined by bank market power as a reflection of 
other observable or unobservable bank effects by estimating Model 18 in Table 6 with bank fixed-
effects. The joint t-tests for bank dummies (not reported) are significant, suggesting that, not 
unexpectedly, there are other bank effects being associated with cost of debt. However, the 
coefficients of our main regressors are still highly consistent with baseline estimations in terms of 
magnitude and statistical significance. This confirms that the key findings are not biased 
reflections of other banking effects. 
 
29 Alternative measures for each of our control variables are available from authors on request. 
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Fifth, we address the potential endogeneity concern by re-estimating our main 
specification using an instrumental variable approach and a lagged variable approach. We follow 
Anginer et al. (2014) to instrument bank market power variable by lagged growth of gross loan 
rate30 (Model 19) and lagged Lerner index (Model 20). The principles are that the former assumes 
that expanding gross loans would generate more bank market power and the latter is a classic 
econometric solution to address endogeneity. In addition to the instrumental variable estimations 
used to pull the trigger on potential endogeneity, we lag our main independent variables by one-
year to address the concern of reverse causality in Model 21. All the main regressors from Model 
18, 19 and 20 are significant at 1% level and have the signs consistent with our main estimations, 
confirming the robustness of our key results. 
In addition, we include the squared term for the market power variable in Model 22 (Table 
6) to consider possible non-linearity. If the collinearity problem between its quadratic form and 
itself is to be ignored (coefficient of correlation >0.8), estimation outputs indicate that, because 
the symmetry axes (turning points) is not located in a meaningful area, this result does not support 
an inverse u-shaped relationship. Because the squared term and the linear term are both negative 
and significant, it supports the linear relation observed in the baseline estimations.  
Last, we substitute Lerner index by lending market Lerner index, and HHI by 
concentration-3 ratio in Models 18-22, and our results remain unchanged. For Model 21, we also 
test lagging all the control variables by one year and results still hold. Finally, we check the 
possible debt composition effects on the main findings based on baseline Model 6 by including 
short-term debt ratio (ratio of short-term debt to total debt) and a variable that controls for 
observations which do not have long-term debt (14% of the regression sample), and our baseline 
results are still robust. 
(Please insert Table 6 about here) 
 
4.3. Heterogeneity tests 
The favorable effects of market power on SME cost of debt concluded above may vary over certain 
firm and country features. In Tables 7 and 8, we report the results of testing the heterogeneity of 
market power effects by employing both interactive term and grouping approaches based on the 
baseline Model 6 in Table 3 to ensure result validity and robustness. 
 
30 Estimation result does not change if we instrument Lerner index by current growth of gross loan ratio. 
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Theoretically, innovative SMEs are higher in information opaqueness and therefore the 
IBH effect should be stronger for such SMEs. We group samples into non-innovative (38,638 obs.) 
and innovative (11,990 obs.) SMEs. Results in Table 7 show little significant difference in the 
values of Lerner index coefficients. The interaction terms of innovation dummy and bank market 
power are not significant in the next two columns, all suggesting that the degree of bank market 
power effects on cost of capital is not statistically dependent on firm’s innovation activities. The 
possible reason of this statistically insignificant results is that, unlike using R&D expenses as a 
proxy for firm innovation, our time-invariant binary variable is less econometrically favorable 
because of the low numerical variations. 
Although all firms in our sample are SMEs, their size varies significantly. The sample is 
regrouped into three (Model 2) as micro firms (<10 employees and turnover <2m euros), small 
firms (10-49 employees and turnover <10m euros) and medium-sized firms (50-249 employees 
and turnover<50m euros). After excluding size control variable, the trend of Lerner index 
coefficient values is interpreted as stronger favorable effects of market power on cost of debt for 
smaller firms. This is in line with the IBH since smaller firms’ credit approval is more dependent 
on soft and private information processed by creditors and SMEs normally lack of formal credit 
history. This argument is supported by the positively significant coefficients of bank market power 
and size interaction terms in the full sample regressions.  
(Please insert Table 7 about here) 
 
It is expected that SMEs with higher level of information opacity would benefit more from 
increasing level of bank market power as suggested by IBH because banks’ investment in soft 
information acquisition could be more effective to them. We follow Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia (2004) and use the ratio of total assets to fixed assets as a proxy of private information 
at industry level31. SMEs are grouped into three from less to more informationally opaque (Model 
3, 3’, 3’’). Meanwhile, interaction terms of bank market power and opacity are positively 
significant with meaningful values of coefficients. Regression outcomes conclude that the 
favorable effect of bank market power on cost of credit is stronger for SMEs with higher level of 
opacity, supporting IBH. However, the cost of debt is generally higher for less informationally 
opaque SMEs, offsetting the desirable bank market power effects. 
 
31 Alternatively, we use the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at industry-level, and results hold. 
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We have also tested the Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) hypothesis discussed in Section 2. 
Such hypothesis holds when the favorable effects of bank market power on SME credit cost is 
stronger for creditworthy firms. With the absence of credit rating data, we use risk-related variables 
such as firm profitability, turnover, liquidity, and solvency ratios. In a short remark32, all these 
risk-related variables are not found to have moderating effects on the relation between bank market 
power and SME credit cost, thus we conclude that bank market power effect is more sensitive to 
the information opaqueness of SMEs rather than to their risk-level. Hence, the Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005) hypothesis is not empirically valid in our sample.  
In terms of macroeconomic characteristics (Table 8), it is not ideal to group our sample by 
country-level variables and therefore we examine the moderating effects by interaction terms only. 
The significantly negative coefficients on the interaction term of Lerner index and HHI specify 
that the favorable effects of bank market power on investing in private information acquisition and 
building relationship lending are stronger in concentrated banking markets although banking 
concentration increases SME financing constraints. 
Beck et al. (2004) suggest that bank competition effects on SME finance can be either 
enhanced or mitigated by the economic framework. We test such moderating effects represented 
by economic growth and financial development. As reviewed in Section 2, Ruckes (2004) and 
Demiroglu et al. (2012) conjecture that the effect of bank market power on SME borrowing cost 
is diminished under sound economic conditions. However, we do not find support to their 
hypothesis as the interaction terms of bank market power and economic growth indicator in Model 
5 are not statistically significant. Empirical evidence has also shown that financial development 
soothes the bank competition effect on SME finance (Love and Peria, 2014) and financial 
development is also associated with lower information asymmetries because of the higher quality 
of bank risk assessment processes (Godlewski and Weill, 2011). It is therefore hypothesized that 
in countries with better financial development, the beneficial effects of banks with a greater market 
power assimilating soft information on informationally opaque firm are attenuated. The interaction 
terms in Model 6 are positively entered, being translated as supporting evidence on such a 
hypothesis. 
Finally, we examine two information related institutional factors that could potentially 
modify the market power effect. One is an index for the depth of credit information (CID) at 
 
32 Results are not presented due to space limit but available on request from authors. 
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country level, ranging from 0 to 8 indicating low to high level of rules affecting the scope, 
accessibility, and quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries, 
to facilitate lending decisions. The other one is an index for business extent of disclosure at country 
level ranging from 0 to 10 indicating low to high level of the extent to which investors are protected 
through disclosure of financial information. Both indices measure the strength of information in 
an economy and our empirical results in Models 7 and 8 show that both factors weaken the market 
power effect, bolstering the Information-based Hypothesis.  
(Please insert Table 8 about here) 
 
5: Conclusion 
Due to the great contribution of SME sector to the EU economy, the importance of bank financing 
in SME growth and the intrinsic financing constraints of SMEs, this paper focuses on the banking 
effects on SME financial constraints by studying the impacts of bank market power and banking 
market concentration on the cost of debt of SMEs in 17 EU countries over the period of 2007 to 
2015. Our sample contains 77,911 SMEs being matched with 528 banks and, our market power 
measures are derived from a sample of 3,319 banks from the 17 countries. 
Our main finding is that bank market power at disaggregate level reduces the cost of debt 
of SMEs. Numerically, the cost of debt for a typical SME reduces by 6.2% of the median value 
when the bank market power increases by one-standard-deviation. Or, from the probability 
perspective, the probability of a rise in financing cost of an SME reduces by approximately 4.3% 
if the Lerner index increases by one-standard-deviation. The favorable effects of bank market 
power on SME cost of debt are more pronounced for those SMEs who are smaller and more 
informationally opaque. The favorable effects are also stronger within economies where banking 
markets are more concentrated, and subject to higher degree of information obstacles and less 
informationally transparent since banks investing in relationship-based lending techniques 
becomes more effective. These findings support the Information-based Hypothesis where due to 
the crucial role of information asymmetries, greater competition reduces the market power of 
banks and impedes banks from investing in private (soft) information acquisition or building 
relationship with smaller and less transparent firms 
Our results are not consistent with Rice and Strahan (2010) and Giannetti and Ongena 
(2009) that advocate the favorable effects of tackling bank market power on SME debt interest 
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rates. Our study shows little evidence supporting Market Power Hypothesis as empirically 
concluded in Love and Peria (2014) and Mudd (2013), both suggesting that competition relaxes 
SME credit constraint with an emphasis on the access to finance by SMEs. This is because our 
sample contains only those observations which have accessed debt finance and they are less likely 
to be financially constrained compared with those who have not accessed debt finance. Samples 
used in Love and Peria (2014) and Mudd (2013) include a higher proportion of SMEs that are more 
likely to be financially constrained or even excluded. This could have suggested that bank market 
power at disaggregate level negatively affects the probability and usage of debt finance, especially 
for those SMEs who are more credit constrained and financially excluded. However, for those 
SMEs who has gained access to finance, bank market power promotes relationship lending 
activities and reduces SME cost of debt. In addition, our empirical evidence does not support the 
hypotheses proposed by Ergungor (2004), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), and Ruckes (2004) and 
Demiroglu et al. (2012), as detailed in Section 2. 
Besides the primary findings, our empirical results also show that cost of debt finance is 
higher for those SMEs which are younger, smaller, and involving in innovation activities. Other 
firm characteristics, such as liquidity, tangibility, trade credit usage, depreciation rate and working 
capital are all influential factors of cost of debt finance as expected. SMEs operating in industries 
at the time of higher growth opportunity are likely to be charged at higher costs. In addition, we 
show that in general, larger banks provide credit at a higher price and SME credit availability is 
more constrained in a more concentrated banking market, indicating the different effects of 
concentration and competition on SME finance. 
Our paper is the first study investigating the bank market power effect on SME credit cost 
at firm-bank level in the EU. The implications for policy makers are that pro-competitive policies 
that suppress bank market power could reduce the incentives and necessities of banks in investing 
in private information acquisition and relationship lending. However, bank competition has 
substantial merits under general economic theories such as increasing financial stability in 
European countries (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Leroy and Lucotte, 2017). In terms of the SME 
sector, prior literature has also shown that bank competition could reduce financial exclusion and 
increase credit availability (e.g. Beck et al., 2004; Chong et al., 2013, Ryan et al., 2014). Hence, 
as encouraging anti-competitive policy and market power in the banking industry could overall 
introduce loss outweighing the gain, policymakers should consider the balance between the pros 
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and cons of different competition promoting strategies and the consequences to different types of 
microeconomic agents. Policymakers must also pay attentions to the measures of reducing 
information barriers between SMEs and creditors to enable financial institutions to allocate their 
funds more efficiently, and at a bank risk-taking level. Attentions should also be paid on striking 
unfair lending prices. In 2014, SMEs’ average borrowing costs were 140 basis points higher than 
those of large enterprises in the Eurozone33, and this figure went up to 210 for micro firms (Kaya, 
2014). Although high credit cost may reflect higher risk, it could also be one of the hindrances 
impairing SME borrowers’ survival and development. Moreover, high credit cost could result in 
severer consequences damaging the financial stability than credit rationing as the Moral Hazard 
dilemma (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) has suggested that borrowers may be incentivized to 
exercise less effort or take on higher business risk after the issuance of a loan to compensate the 
high interest cost, therefore putting the banking industry at risk.  
However, there have been several solutions34 on reducing the information asymmetries 
between creditors and SME borrowers, reducing the risk of creditors and SME borrowing costs, 
and facilitating credit supply to SMEs. 
One of the solutions would be the governments’ development of sustainable Credit 
Guarantee Schemes (CGSs). A CGS is a tool that facilitates lending to smaller businesses that are 
less able to directly obtain finance from their commercial creditors (e.g. banks) due to having 
difficulties meeting their creditors’ security requirements, for example, collateral requirements. 
Such a government-backed guarantee is a form of loan collateral that would allow borrowers to 
apply for loan funds beyond its own collateral limits, and transfer the credit risk of creditors to the 
government guarantors. Hence, reducing creditors’ risk and increasing the flow of funds into 
businesses that have difficulties raising funds, including the SME sector (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-
Hesary, 2018). For example, the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) Scheme launched in 2009 
in the UK has been providing loan guarantees to facilitate lending to viable businesses that have 
been turned down for a normal commercial loan due to a lack of security or a proven track record. 
The EFG provides the lender with a government-backed guarantee of up to 75%, and the creditors 
(banks) are fully delegated to lending decisions. Until the end of 2017, it has supported the 
provision of over GBP £3.3 billion of finance to more than 35,000 smaller businesses in the UK. 
 
33 All 19 Eurozone countries are members of the European Union. 
34 We thank an anonymous referee for providing us the ideas on this matter. 
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However, there are still two concerns of the EFG, or any other CGSs35. Firstly, the government’s 
coverage ratio. A high credit guarantee policy may introduce moral hazard problem, where lending 
institutions (e.g. banks) would decrease their effort input level in monitoring and analyzing the 
healthiness of borrowers, resulting in an increase in the number of nonperforming loans and a 
decrease in the productivity of public reserve (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2016)36. Secondly, 
for SME borrowers, a CSG comes at a cost. Using the UK’s EFG as an example, small business 
borrowers supported via EFG are required to pay a 2% annual fee to the government, as a 
contribution towards the cost of the scheme. Hence, such a scheme may not necessarily reduce the 
lending costs, although it promotes a better credit supply to SMEs.  
Another solution of the aforementioned problems would be the development of SME credit 
risk databases and SME credit rating models. SMEs’ financial and non-financial accounts are often 
difficult to assess, but Japan’s Credit Risk Database (CRD) of the CRD Association as a 
nationwide financial infrastructure provides an example that is worth addressing. The Japan’s CRD 
is a membership system (with 180 CGS and financial institution members in 2015) whose 
members maintain the database by offering SME financial statements (Kuwahara et al., 2015). As 
of 31st of March 2015, the Japan’s CRD includes data on 3.309 million incorporated and sole-
proprietor SMEs, which was around 95% of the total SME population, and the database for 
enterprises in default covered 500,000 SMEs (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2015). The 
purpose of the CRD is to reduce information asymmetries and to provide a credit rating service on 
SMEs for lending agencies, therefore improving the efficiency of credit supply to SMEs 
(Kuwahara et al., 2015). With such a large-scale SME financial database, the CRD Association 
has been able to introduce a reliable statistical method into evaluating SMEs’ credit risk through 
“the law of large numbers”. In fact, the CRD Association has built several credit ratings models 
(scoring systems) for the assessment of the credit risk of incorporated SMEs and sole-proprietor 
SMEs, and both have been in use in the Credit Insurance System. Essentially speaking, the scoring 
models produce an estimated probability of default for each SME by adopting logistic regression 
 
35 For a more detailed review of the general principles and adoption of CGSs, please see Yoshino and 
Taghizadeh-Hesary (2018) and Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary (2016). And for the UK’s EFG, please see 
https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/ourpartners/supporting-business-loans-enterprise-finance-
guarantee/about-efg/ 
36 See Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary (2019) for a research on the determinants of an optimal credit 
guarantee ratio for SMEs. 
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techniques on a large number of financial indexes that correlate with defaults, such as profitability, 
coverage, leverage, liquidity, etc., with accumulated qualitative data (Kuwahara et al., 2019). Such 
scoring systems present a universal standard for the assessment of business risk and are an effective 
remedy for asymmetric information that can also be used for the development of the member’s 
own internal rating system (Kuwahara et al., 2015)37. In the EU countries, using the UK as an 
example, the CRIF Decision Solutions Limited provides a QuiScore that uses a proprietary model 
that utilizes both financial and non-financial information (e.g. directors’ history, County Court 
Judgements) to estimate the likelihood of company default for the coming 12 months, which is 
evidenced to be an effective indicator of the economic resilience of firms (Soroka et al., 2019). 
This QuiScore covers a large percentage of the population of UK SMEs that have published annual 
accounts, and its score is classified into five rating groups: secure, stable, normal, caution and high 
risk. However, there is still a concern that the score is prone to unaudited financial statements’ 
outliers and less precise data, and therefore less effective for the assessment of micro firms, which 
could also result in borrower discouragement. 
One solution that can have a favorable impact on reducing bank credit cost of SMEs would 
be the launch of a funding scheme where the government can conditionally supply funding to 
commercial lenders (e.g. Banks) at a lower deposit rate requirement for the purpose of a boost of 
cheaper credit supply to SMEs. The UK’s Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) is a strong 
representative of the idea. The FLS was launched by the Bank of England (the Bank) and HM 
Treasury in 2012, with the aim of encouraging lending to UK households and private non-financial 
corporations by making more cheaper funding available to banks and building societies 38 , 
conditional on their lending to the real economy. Cheaper credit should boost consumption and 
investment and results in increased economic activity and incomes (Bank of England, 2012). 
However, there have been undesirable figures and views on the Scheme since its introduction. 
Early evidence (Milligan, 2013) has shown that the scheme only has a small impact on business 
lending, despite the reduced cost of loans to businesses claimed by participating banks of the 
scheme. In addition, the real effect of FLS is difficult to quantify, noted by the Bank’s chief 
economist Martin Ellis (Milligan, 2013). Data has also shown that the lending to small businesses 
 
37 For a comprehensive review of the Japan’s CRD, their Statistical Scoring Model, and practicality, please 
see Kuwahara et al. (2015) and Kuwahara et al. (2019). 
38 Since January 2014, the FLS is no longer available to support mortgage lending. 
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under FLS falls continuously two years after the introduction of the scheme, with a drop by £723m, 
followed by a drop of £435m in the next quarter (Source: Bank of England). One concern of FLS, 
or a similar scheme to SMEs is that, it does not necessarily help to reduce information barriers 
between informationally opaque or risker borrowers and banks, although it can provide cheaper 
credit to firms that are more transparent and have a better credit history.  
We address the limitations of this research and the recommendations for future studies as 
follows. First, our sample covers 17 economies but the other 11 EU countries could not be included 
due to the absence of required information (e.g. interest payment data), making the result less 
persuasive for an EU study. Future studies could benefit from a larger sample coverage. Second, 
since all the 17 EU countries in our study are developed countries, the tests on country level 
heterogeneity effects of bank market power are less persuasive compared with Love and Peria 
(2014) and Beck et al. (2004). Third, our cost of debt is implicitly measured and the numerical 
interpretations would be more accurate if loan level data was available. In the end, we call for 
future research to further explore the solutions to reduce information barriers between commercial 
lenders (e.g. banks) and SMEs, and the effectiveness of relevant lending schemes that aim at 


















Appendix A: Bank market power measures 
 
We follow Fosu et al. (2018), Love and Peria (2014) and Anginer et al. (2014) to generate the 
Lerner index as a proxy of disaggregate level bank market power. The Lerner index is defined as 




                                     (A1) 
 
where P is the output price and MC denotes the marginal cost. Price is measured as the (gross 
income plus dividend income) / total assets, or alternatively, total earning assets replaces total 
assets. The marginal cost is the first-order derivative of the following trans-log cost function with 
respect to output.  
 
ln(TC) = α + β1ln(Q) + β2 (ln(Q))
2 + β3ln(W1) + β4ln(W2) + β5ln(W3) + β6ln(Q)ln(W1) 




   + β12ln(W1)ln(W2) + β12ln(W1)ln(W3) + β12ln(W2)ln(W3) + δln(controls) + FE  
    + year effects + ε                                                                    (A2) 
 
In Equation A2, total cost (TC) is the total expenses of a bank and output (Q) is proxied by bank 
total assets (or total earning assets). They change to gross loan or total deposits, money market and 
short-term funding when estimating lending market Lerner Index. W1 is the cost of labor, measured 
by personnel expenses to total assets (or total earning assets). W2 is the cost of fund measured by 
total interest expenses over total deposit money market and short-term funding, or alternatively 
interest expenses to average interest-bearing liabilities. W3 is the cost of physical capital measured 
by total non-interest expenses (excluding personnel expenses) to fixed assets. Controls are bank 
leverage ratio (equity to total assets), liquidity ratio (loans to assets) and net interest margin. 
Subscripts i and t denote bank i at time t and it is removed in Equation A2 for simplicity. In the 
trans-log function, the symmetry condition is imposed and estimation is done under the restriction 
of linear homogeneity of degree on in input prices. We use alternative measures for Lerner index 
variables in our robustness check with different combinations allowed. Using the full 3,319 bank 
data as discussed in Section 3.1, models are estimated with two-way fixed effects or alternatively, 
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we estimate the Equation A2 separately in each country for robustness check. Results do not 
change if estimations are done using random-effect and pooled OLS estimators. 
 
We then use the coefficients estimated from equation (A2) to calculate marginal cost for each bank 
as in below equation: 
 
MC = TC/Q        (A3) 
 
Lerner index is then calculated taking the MC derived from Equation A3 to Equation A1. 
 
For calculating the Lerner index at lending market as discussed in Section 3.2.2. We use the exact 
same method by following Forssbeck and Shehzad (2015). In brief, as shown in Equation A4, 
similar to the above steps of generating Lerner index, we now introduce two outputs into the trans-
log total cost function at both deposit market and lending market. Hence, the marginal cost on 
lending market is the first-order derivative of total cost regarding to outputs at the lending market.  
 
Lending market Lerner Index =
RL − RM−MCL
RL
                    (A4) 
 
The lending market Lerner index is calculated as Equation A4, where RL is calculated by a bank’s 
ratio of interest income to loans, as a reverse proxy of bank lending price. RM is the market rate 
measured by the mean of country level nominal short-term and long-term interest rates. MCL is 
the marginal cost derived from the trans-log cost function at the lending market. Detailed 
procedures of calculating the lending market Lerner index (and depositing market Lerner index) 










Appendix B: Definitions and sources of variables 
 
Variables Definition Original source
Dependent variables
Cost of Debt (COD) Ratio of SME financial expenses to average short-term & 
long-term debt
BVD Amadeus
COD. Robustness BVD Amadeus
Main variables
Lerner index
Lending market Lerner index
ECB Data Warehouse
Concentration Global Financial Development
Firm variables
Firm size Natural logarithm of SME's total assets in dollars BVD Amadeus
Firm age Natural logarithm of SME's age plus 10 BVD Amadeus
Cash-richness Cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets (without 
cash)
BVD Amadeus
Tangibility Fixed tangibile assets scaled by total assets. BVD Amadeus
Liquidity (Current assets - stock) / Current liabilities. BvD Amadeus
Trade credit Net trade credit scaled by total assts. BvD Amadeus
Growth opportunity BvD Amadeus
Depreciation Ratio of depreciation to total assets BvD Amadeus
Working capital Ratio of working capital divided by total assets BvD Amadeus
Short-term Ratio of short-term debt to total debt BvD Amadeus





Bank size Fitch Connect
Bank NIM Net interest margin Fitch Connect
Country variabes
GDP growth rate  Annual growth rate of GDP World Development Indicators
Inflation World Development Indicators
Bank development Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) World Development Indicators
Credit info. Depth Depth of credit information index (0-8) World Bank Job database
Business disclosure Business extent of disclosure index (0-10) World Development Indicators
Sum of total assets of three largest banks in a banking 
market as a share of total banking industry assets.
Industry-level median sales growth rate or for robustness, 
industry's intangible assets to total assets.
Time invariant binary variable equals to one if a SME has 
ever had a patent or trademark
Natural logarithm of bank's total assets in thousands of 
dollars
Annual percentage inflation rate, GDP deflator or 
consumer prices
HHI Index Herfindahl-Hirschman index, sum of the squared values of 
each bank's market share  (total assets) in a banking 
market
Other robustness check measures derived from COD, see 
details in Section 4.2
Measure(s) of individual bank market power, see details 
in Appendix A
Fitch Connect and BankFocus
Measure(s) of individual bank lending market power, see 
details in Appendix A
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Table 1: Statistics of main variables by country 
 
Cost of debt (COD) Lerner index Lending market Lerner index HHI
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Austria 0.072 0.045 0.081 0.211 0.205 0.088 0.719 0.775 0.189 0.042 0.004
Cyprus 0.090 0.074 0.058 0.253 0.260 0.126 0.796 0.848 0.164 0.121 0.022
Germany 0.086 0.059 0.081 0.212 0.208 0.082 0.734 0.807 0.206 0.026 0.005
Spain 0.072 0.051 0.071 0.258 0.248 0.111 0.634 0.717 0.267 0.063 0.015
France 0.093 0.059 0.093 0.230 0.225 0.098 0.697 0.778 0.251 0.061 0.004
UK 0.058 0.042 0.062 0.252 0.240 0.137 0.750 0.809 0.199 0.048 0.004
Greece 0.075 0.066 0.052 0.203 0.210 0.086 0.700 0.778 0.224 0.156 0.046
Croatia 0.102 0.077 0.087 0.192 0.173 0.099 0.603 0.629 0.149 0.138 0.001
Hungary 0.153 0.122 0.109 0.216 0.218 0.124 0.462 0.475 0.252 0.086 0.003
Ireland 0.051 0.037 0.055 0.220 0.208 0.115 0.669 0.727 0.251 0.068 0.002
Lithuania 0.085 0.062 0.071 0.228 0.208 0.121 0.566 0.633 0.271 0.178 0.011
Latvia 0.072 0.050 0.074 0.319 0.312 0.143 0.672 0.759 0.286 0.106 0.009
Malta 0.061 0.047 0.059 0.322 0.301 0.169 0.737 0.787 0.194 0.134 0.018
Netherland 0.098 0.065 0.092 0.209 0.203 0.099 0.707 0.774 0.248 0.207 0.007
Poland 0.123 0.092 0.096 0.208 0.186 0.107 0.490 0.504 0.139 0.060 0.004
Portugal 0.067 0.050 0.061 0.220 0.214 0.112 0.779 0.814 0.147 0.117 0.004
Slovenia 0.070 0.053 0.064 0.231 0.218 0.114 0.691 0.767 0.237 0.115 0.009  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. P1 P99 Skew. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
COD 316568 0.079 0.054 0.080 0.004 0.422 2.526 0.002 0.500
COD. CV 315415 0.061 0.037 0.081 -0.026 0.416 2.617 -0.036 0.500
RCOD 303504 0.063 0.036 0.082 -0.010 0.418 2.599 -0.013 0.500
COD. GR 292975 -0.001 0.000 0.549 -1.306 1.318 0.015 -1.412 1.425
COD. Delta 316568 0.000 -2.369 7.862 -8.218 33.919 2.547 -10.693 44.518
Main bank variables
Lerner index 651261 0.230 0.234 0.117 -0.161 0.441 -1.720 -0.930 0.706
LM. Lerner index 648493 0.775 0.875 0.283 -0.024 1.126 -1.403 -1.491 1.213
HHI Index 688841 0.064 0.055 0.039 0.018 0.220 2.712 0.018 0.341
Concentration 608028 67.398 66.016 11.218 42.445 98.604 0.567 38.562 100.000
Firm variables
Firm size 579051 16.429 16.345 1.255 13.189 19.926 0.083 8.525 25.276
Firm age 677369 3.444 3.434 0.489 2.485 4.736 0.342 2.398 6.474
Cash 551320 0.168 0.053 0.312 0.000 1.646 3.980 0.000 3.000
Tangibility 566652 0.218 0.120 0.247 0.000 0.952 1.373 0.000 1.000
Liquidity 553107 1.999 1.058 4.891 0.042 22.681 9.236 0.001 85.000
Trade credit 537325 -0.068 -0.034 0.191 -0.605 0.438 -0.240 -0.717 0.552
Growth Opp. 694332 0.011 0.000 0.089 -0.095 0.243 1.171 -0.167 0.254
Depreciation 472592 0.031 0.022 0.029 0.000 0.134 1.614 0.000 0.169
Working capital 535815 0.239 0.210 0.234 -0.202 0.823 0.494 -0.295 0.893
Innovation 694368 0.213 0.000 0.410 0.000 1.000 1.400 0.000 1.000
Bank & Country controls
Bank size 663088 18.964 19.313 2.144 14.109 21.810 -0.534 8.400 21.843
NIM 656120 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.040 1.149 0.000 0.069
GDP growth rate 694368 0.738 1.313 2.668 -6.564 6.045 -0.377 -14.814 26.276
Inflation (CPI) 694368 1.422 1.530 1.348 -1.044 5.185 2.343 -9.753 20.149
Bank develop. 693458 122.89 114.77 42.01 43.20 196.15 0.18 36.12 253.57
Credit info. Depth 614043 5.607 6.000 1.299 3.000 8.000 -0.284 0.000 8.000




Table 3: Baseline results 
 
Model 1 Model 1' Model 2 Model 2' Model 3 Model 3' Model 4 Model 4' Model 5 Model 5' Model 6 Model 6' Model 7 Model 7'
Dependent variable:
Cost of debt (COD)
Main regressors
Lerner index -2.495*** -2.353*** -1.918*** -2.608*** -2.487*** -2.882*** -0.951***
(0.144) (0.156) (0.154) (0.161) (0.160) (0.162) (0.158)
Lending market Lerner -2.718*** -2.811*** -3.139*** -2.963*** -3.126*** -3.653*** -0.252*
(0.087) (0.102) (0.105) (0.105) (0.108) (0.087) (0.146)
HHI 0.377*** 0.360*** 0.407*** 0.354*** 0.364*** 0.374*** 0.322*** 0.319***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm & industry controls
Firm size -0.768*** -0.816*** -0.966*** -0.997*** -0.868*** -0.912*** -0.997*** -1.013*** -0.901*** -0.937*** -1.319*** -1.021*** -0.562*** -0.560***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.029) (0.029)
Firm age -8.771*** -3.783*** -8.058*** -3.473*** -9.747*** -5.076*** -7.806*** -3.172*** -9.249*** -4.905***
(0.214) (0.272) (0.252) (0.307) (0.324) (0.365) (0.257) (0.313) (0.329) (0.370)
Cash -0.244 -0.259 -0.166 -0.162 -0.204 -0.204 -0.140 -0.132 -0.263 -0.238 -0.053 -0.055
(0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.168) (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.088) (0.088)
Liquidity -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Tangibility -2.859*** -3.080*** -2.776*** -2.956*** -2.811*** -3.035*** -2.731*** -2.903*** -2.481*** -3.137*** -4.155*** -4.164***
(0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.207) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) (0.119) (0.119)
Trade credit 2.249*** 2.151*** 2.286*** 2.126*** 2.187*** 2.096*** 2.226*** 2.087***
(0.344) (0.345) (0.345) (0.345) (0.346) (0.347) (0.347) (0.347)
Depreciation 2.175* 1.417 3.897*** 3.274** 1.746 1.192 3.428*** 2.947** 2.286* 2.404* -3.467*** -3.467***
(1.307) (1.317) (1.323) (1.323) (1.305) (1.314) (1.321) (1.322) (1.326) (1.322) (0.816) (0.816)
Growth opportunity 2.575*** 2.353*** 2.487*** 2.300*** 2.581*** 2.116*** 2.718*** 2.335*** 5.139*** 2.766*** -0.806 -0.795
(0.170) (0.169) (0.172) (0.171) (0.174) (0.173) (0.176) (0.175) (0.167) (0.168) (0.609) (0.609)
Working capital -0.595* -0.769** -0.479 -0.622* -0.604* -0.767** -0.495 -0.619* -2.352*** -2.342*** -2.220*** -2.219***
(0.341) (0.342) (0.343) (0.342) (0.343) (0.344) (0.344) (0.344) (0.208) (0.207) (0.108) (0.108)
Innovation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.886*** 0.881***
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A (0.072) (0.072)
Bank & Country controls
Bank size 0.780*** 0.956*** 0.266** 0.483*** 0.447*** 0.528*** 0.221*** 0.221***
(0.107) (0.109) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.018) (0.019)
Bank NIM 0.382*** -0.070 0.682*** 0.218*** 1.030*** 0.273*** 0.201*** 0.123***
(0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.039) (0.037)
GDP growth rate -0.107*** -0.152*** -0.115*** -0.147*** -0.157*** -0.130*** -0.036*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Inflation 0.214*** 0.142*** 0.253*** 0.105*** 0.438*** 0.248*** 0.261*** 0.118*** 0.447*** 0.250*** 0.712*** 0.351*** 0.155*** 0.149***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Bank development -0.012*** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 296,369 294,851 257,908 256,616 255,435 255,505 255,374 254,103 252,983 253,053 255,201 255,271 255,201 255,271
Groups 55,748 55,701 50,629 50,577 50,466 50,469 50,468 50,417 50,309 50,313 50,628 50,632 50,628 50,632
Estimator F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. RE MLE RE MLE
R2 48.99% 49.31% 49.55% 49.84% 49.91% 51.07% 49.61% 49.91% 49.97% 50.19% 49.52% 50.06% N/A N/A  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Constants are added but not reported. F.E. and RE 
MLE respectively stand for fixed-effect and random-effect maximum likelihood estimator. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm 
fixed-effects. In the RE MLE Model 7 we allow for firm’s country, industry and legal-form dummies being inserted, but results do not vary if dummies are removed. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and results do not change if they are clustered at industry or country level. For all these fixed-effect models, results are robust with White 




Table 4: Robustness tests - Sample regrouping 
 
Model 1 Model 1' Model 2 Model 2' Model 3 Model 3' Model 3'' Model 4 Model 4'
Dependetnt variable COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD
Grouping
Sample Big 4 Non-Big 4 07-09 10-15 Manu. Wholesale Others Less More
Main regressors
Lerner index -2.521*** -3.455*** -2.099*** -1.042*** -2.754*** -3.865*** -2.037*** -3.180*** -2.426***
(0.198) (0.306) (0.321) (0.188) (0.280) (0.299) (0.264) (0.331) (0.135)
HHI 0.353*** 0.256*** 1.139*** 0.268*** 0.425*** 0.504*** 0.157*** 0.551*** 0.213***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.090) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.012)
Firm & industry controls
Firm size -1.204*** -1.648*** -0.097 -1.008*** -1.843*** -1.490*** -0.853*** -1.126*** -0.789***
(0.085) (0.184) (0.176) (0.101) (0.149) (0.140) (0.117) (0.143) (0.074)
Cash -0.175 -1.554*** -0.223 0.057 -0.473 -0.516 -0.010 -0.323 -0.799***
(0.175) (0.514) (0.318) (0.213) (0.348) (0.324) (0.232) (0.231) (0.185)
Liquidity -0.043*** -0.002 -0.036* -0.036*** -0.060* -0.030 -0.041*** -0.019 -0.025***
(0.009) (0.026) (0.020) (0.011) (0.032) (0.034) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008)
Tangibility -2.445*** -3.668*** -1.636*** -3.833*** -4.482*** -4.622*** -0.867*** -4.117*** -0.122
(0.227) (0.501) (0.359) (0.311) (0.507) (0.483) (0.245) (0.531) (0.152)
Depreciation -0.966 14.482*** 18.507*** 2.512 3.502 2.925 2.433 0.212 6.662***
(1.476) (2.972) (2.859) (1.576) (2.314) (2.719) (2.014) (2.647) (1.137)
Growth opportunity 3.848*** 5.935*** 1.575*** 4.149*** 5.656*** 5.818*** 4.309*** 5.055*** 4.151***
(0.199) (0.358) (0.407) (0.301) (0.293) (0.306) (0.276) (0.311) (0.139)
Working capital -2.123*** -3.973*** -0.495 -2.130*** -2.699*** -4.068*** -0.605* -1.718*** -1.318***
(0.231) (0.485) (0.404) (0.251) (0.400) (0.360) (0.337) (0.350) (0.183)
Bank & Country
Bank size -0.311** 2.988*** 0.088 0.024 0.580*** 0.381* 0.505*** 0.405* 0.620***
(0.124) (0.268) (0.199) (0.143) (0.202) (0.197) (0.175) (0.214) (0.097)
Bank NIM 0.583*** 1.789*** 0.494*** 0.774*** 1.126*** 1.145*** 0.816*** 1.117*** 0.952***
(0.076) (0.130) (0.099) (0.086) (0.119) (0.108) (0.103) (0.116) (0.056)
GDP growth rate -0.164*** -0.146*** 0.119*** -0.060*** -0.197*** -0.214*** -0.083*** -0.202*** -0.115***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005)
Inflation 0.929*** 0.386*** 0.336*** 0.255*** 0.817*** 0.928*** 0.381*** 0.902*** 0.496***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.018) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030) (0.037) (0.017)
Ovservations 214,849 40,352 76,132 179,069 75,863 86,218 93,120 130,960 124,241
Groups 42,401 8,227 33,478 47,359 14,091 16,413 20,124 35,241 31,478
Estimator F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E.
R
2
48.60% 55.14% 61.29% 57.52% 50.16% 51.44% 46.93% 47.38% 54.23%
By Country By Year By Industry By "total debt ratio"
 
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. F.E. stands 
for fixed-effect estimator. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm fixed-effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and results do not change if they are clustered at industry or country level. In Model 3, SMEs are 
grouped by industry and, from left to right they are industries of Manufacturing, Wholesale and retail trade (including repair of 















Table 5: Robustness tests - Dependent variable substitutions 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Dependetnt variable: COD1P COD2 COD1NA COD1NAL COD.CV RCOD COD. LDVM COD.GR COD.delta COD.CV.adj
Sample: Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Main regressors
Lerner index -2.645*** -0.970*** -2.974*** -3.371*** -1.008*** -1.163*** -0.409*** -0.354*** -3.175*** -1.618***
(0.166) (0.053) (0.186) (0.199) (0.156) (0.163) (0.027) (0.017) (0.164) (0.171)
HHI 0.374*** 0.066*** 0.341*** 0.340*** 0.362*** 0.402*** 0.004*** -0.002 0.358*** 0.012
(0.016) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.015)
Firm & industry controls
Firm size -1.309*** -0.179*** -2.480*** -0.279*** -0.871*** -1.482*** 0.018*** -0.057*** -1.234*** -1.292***
(0.079) (0.023) (0.087) (0.094) (0.078) (0.081) (0.003) (0.006) (0.077) (0.089)
Cash 0.198 -0.122*** 0.277 -0.564*** -0.281* -0.067 0.001 -0.024* -0.291* 0.166
(0.181) (0.042) (0.197) (0.199) (0.170) (0.181) (0.014) (0.014) (0.166) (0.206)
Liquidity -0.047*** 0.008** -0.064*** -0.024** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.002* -0.003*** -0.045*** -0.053***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.011)
Tangibility -2.141*** 0.660*** -4.131*** -0.938*** -4.006*** -2.540*** -0.104*** -0.068*** -2.456*** -3.107***
(0.209) (0.073) (0.233) (0.243) (0.206) (0.215) (0.015) (0.017) (0.206) (0.232)
Depreciation 1.903 4.256*** 16.776*** -20.648*** 1.818 0.282 0.281** 1.991*** 2.826** -0.581
(1.417) (0.400) (1.509) (1.656) (1.369) (1.406) (0.112) (0.114) (1.329) (1.525)
Growth opportunity 5.915*** 1.212*** 2.395*** 7.590*** 2.201*** 3.888*** 3.140*** 0.410*** 2.154***
(0.170) (0.051) (0.199) (0.216) (0.173) (0.171) (0.055) (0.018) (0.192)
Working capital -2.289*** 0.147*** -3.915*** -1.433*** -2.487*** -2.515*** -0.045*** 0.018 -2.388*** -2.762***
(0.220) (0.054) (0.240) (0.243) (0.213) (0.219) (0.014) (0.027) (0.209) (0.245)
Bank & Country
Bank size 0.095 0.412*** 0.206 0.482*** 0.427*** -0.669*** 0.011*** -0.032*** 0.783*** 0.410***
(0.109) (0.037) (0.125) (0.133) (0.111) (0.112) (0.002) (0.009) (0.110) (0.123)
Bank NIM 0.819*** 0.341*** 0.884*** 1.239*** 0.037*** 0.005 0.950***
(0.064) (0.020) (0.072) (0.078) (0.005) (0.005) (0.064)
GDP growth rate -0.160*** -0.061*** -0.141*** -0.150*** 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.003*** 0.011*** -0.138*** 0.161***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007)
Inflation 0.722*** 0.237*** 0.567*** 0.886*** -0.012*** 0.016*** 0.917***
(0.021) (0.006) (0.022) (0.025) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020)
Ovservations 256,648 334,100 265,723 252,209 258,476 247,858 208,829 235,009 255,201 251,031
Groups 50,232 59,891 52,064 50,899 50,967 50,072 45,498 48,562 50,628 49,539
Estimator F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. Panel probit F.E. F.E. F.E.
R
2
49.53% 52.89% 43.86% 42.25% 48.47% 48.51% N/A 20.31% 49.26% 48.92%  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. F.E. stands 
for fixed-effect estimator. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm fixed-effects. Standard 

















Table 6: Robustness tests - endogeneity, non-linearity, and others 
 
Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22
Dependetnt variable: COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Main regressors
Lerner index -2.825*** -2.734*** -6.274*** -4.770*** l.Lerner -1.184*** Lerner -2.600***
(0.162) (0.157) (1.447) (0.682) (0.172) (0.171)
Lending market Lerner -3.606*** Lerner2 -1.807***
(0.087) (0.339)
HHI 0.373*** 0.353*** 0.404*** 0.337*** l.HHI 0.262*** HHI 0.360***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Firm variables
Firm size -1.296*** -1.389*** -1.123*** -0.654*** -0.912*** -1.338*** -1.368*** -1.328***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.027) (0.063) (0.059) (0.083) (0.077)
Cash -0.275* -0.316* -0.296* -0.018 -0.072 -0.177 -0.215 -0.260
(0.164) (0.165) (0.166) (0.088) (0.122) (0.120) (0.180) (0.166)
Liquidity -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.043***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Tangibility -2.541*** -2.560*** -3.207*** -4.066*** -3.291*** -2.848*** -2.817*** -2.479***
(0.205) (0.204) (0.205) (0.115) (0.205) (0.199) (0.241) (0.205)
Depreciation 2.142 0.681 0.618 -0.682 2.614** 1.689 1.406 2.349*
(1.316) (1.311) (1.317) (0.798) (1.167) (1.147) (1.379) (1.326)
Growth opportunity 5.326*** 5.029*** 2.735*** 5.127*** 1.532*** 2.311*** 3.692*** 5.060***
(0.165) (0.166) (0.169) (0.163) (0.485) (0.288) (0.250) (0.168)
Working capital -2.318*** -2.406*** -2.453*** -1.995*** -0.708*** -2.462*** -2.464*** -2.356***
(0.207) (0.208) (0.208) (0.106) (0.274) (0.162) (0.220) (0.208)
Bank & Country
Bank size 0.237** 0.799*** 0.894*** 0.456*** 0.405*** 0.721*** 0.775*** 0.443***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.109) (0.089) (0.119) (0.100) (0.118) (0.110)
NIM 0.765*** 0.741*** -0.010 1.019*** 1.002*** 1.242*** 0.737*** 1.040***
(0.059) (0.062) (0.061) (0.050) (0.139) (0.082) (0.065) (0.063)
GDP growth rate -0.164*** -0.104*** -0.072*** -0.159*** -0.100*** -0.173*** -0.128*** -0.156***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Inflation 0.757*** 0.532*** 0.180*** 0.725*** 0.401*** 0.644*** 0.629*** 0.703***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Notes BFE IV1 IV2
Ovservations 259,708 257,602 256,322 255,201 215,578 223,421 229,472 255,201
Groups 51,198 50,786 50,735 50,628 42,530 43,266 49,473 50,628
Estimator F.E. F.E. F.E. RE MLE 2SLS IV FE 2SLS IV FE F.E. F.E.
R2 49.41% 49.27% 49.89% N/A 2.90% 2.21% 51.43% 49.52%  
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
F.E. stands for fixed-effect estimator. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm 
fixed-effects. Standard errors of F.E. models are clustered at firm level and results do not change if they are clustered at 
industry or country level. Model 18 includes bank fixed-effects (BFE). Instrumental variables for Model 19 and 20 
respectively are bank growth of gross loan and lagged Lerner index. RE MLE stands for random-effect maximum likelihood 
estimator. 2SLS IV FE stands for two-stage least-square instrumental variable fixed-effect estimator. R2 in Models 19 and 










Table 7: Heterogeneity tests (firm characteristics) 
 
Model 1 Model 1' Model 1'' Model 1''' Model 2 Model 2' Model 2'' Model 2''' Model 2'''' Model 3 Model 3' Model 3'' Model 3''' Model 3''''
Dependetnt variable: COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD






 third Full Full
Regressors
Lerner index -2.894*** -2.743*** -2.482*** -4.693*** -3.211*** -1.901*** -5.354*** -1.820*** -2.562*** -3.927*** -2.503***
(0.182) (0.358) (0.166) (0.813) (0.317) (0.208) (0.731) (0.264) (0.277) (0.367) (0.198)
Lending market Lerner -3.457*** -6.366*** -3.503***
(0.088) (0.341) (0.100)
HHI 0.372*** 0.303*** 0.179*** 0.202*** 0.031 0.375*** 0.299*** 0.311*** 0.358*** 0.164*** 0.415*** 0.625*** 0.401*** 0.398***
(0.017) (0.040) (0.009) (0.009) (0.061) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.037) (0.116) (0.016)
Innovation 1.469*** 1.019***
(0.114) (0.155)
Lerner & Innovation -0.583
(0.354)




Lerner * Size 1.110***
(0.271)






LM. Lerner * Opacity -0.029***
(0.009)
Constant & controls
Observations 194,199 61,002 255,201 255,271 17,538 72,350 125,337 213,546 213,607 75,531 83,235 82,446 241,212 241,277
Groups 38,638 11,990 50,628 50,632 5,691 19,553 29,735 47,419 47,422 19,704 23,563 22,292 48,784 48,787
Estimator F.E. F.E. RE MLE RE MLE F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E.
R2 49.71% 48.64% N/A N/A 47.55% 52.72% 51.46% 50.86% 50.24% 51.56% 52.32% 51.13% 49.52% 50.24%
Sample
Innovation Firm size Opacity (information)
CFBM CFBM CFBM
 
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. F.E. and RE MLE stand for fixed-effect and random-effect maximum likelihood estimator respectively. The R-squared 
(adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm fixed-effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are clustered at firm level, results do not change if they are 
clustered at industry or country level. CFBM stands for that the model has entered constant and firm, bank, and macroeconomic control variable. In Model 3, the grouping trisection is done in the 




Table 8: Heterogeneity tests (macroeconomic characteristics) 
 
Model 4 Model 4' Model 5 Model 5' Model 6 Model 6' Model 7 Model 7' Model 8 Model 8'
Dependetnt variable: COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD COD
Interaction term:
Regressors
Lerner -0.235 -2.904*** -4.092*** -2.151** -4.323***
(0.355) (0.161) (0.842) (1.042) (0.673)
LM. Lerner -0.574*** -3.681*** -6.349*** -6.382*** -6.244***
(0.191) (0.088) (0.297) (0.440) (0.267)
HHI 0.456*** 0.929*** 1.031*** 0.279*** 0.475*** 0.382*** 0.412*** 0.419*** 0.251*** 0.404***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.064) (0.062) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023)
Lerner * HHI -0.375***
(0.043)
LM. Lerner * HHI -0.581***
(0.033)
GDP growth rate -0.171*** -0.169***
(0.014) (0.026)
Lerner * GDPGR 0.053
(0.049)
LM. Lerner * GDPGR 0.049
(0.031)
Financial development 0.004** -0.027***
(0.002) (0.002)
Lerner * FD 0.014***
(0.005)
LM. Lerner & FD 0.019***
(0.002)
Credit info. Depth 0.795*** -0.656***
(0.100) (0.072)
Lerner * CID 0.341**
(0.168)
LM. Lerner * CID 0.579***
(0.078)
Business disclosure 0.343*** -0.169***
(0.045) (0.048)
Lerner * BD 0.142*
(0.082)
LM. Lerner * BD 0.327***
(0.032)
Constant & controls
Observations 255,201 255,271 255,201 255,271 235,261 235,331 231,948 234,540 249,801 251,744
Groups 50,628 50,632 50,628 50,632 49,530 49,535 49,442 49,467 50,388 50,476
Estimator F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E. F.E.
R
2
49.53% 50.19% 49.52% 50.06% 50.54% 51.10% 51.26% 50.99% 49.55% 49.95%
Banking Mkt. HHI Economic growth Financial development Credit info. depth Business disclosure
CFBM CFBM CFBM CFBM CFBM
 
*, ** and *** respectively represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. F.E. stands 
for fixed-effect estimator. The R-squared (adjusted-R2) for F.E. models include variations captured by firm fixed-effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and results do not change if they are clustered at industry or country level. CFBM stands for that the 
model has entered constant and firm, bank, and macroeconomic control variable. 
 
